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The conﬂict adaptation account proposes that participants adjust attention to target
and distracting stimuli in response to conﬂict. This is argued to explain the proportion
congruent effect, wherein the congruency effect decreases as the proportion of conﬂicting
incongruent trials increases. Some reports further argue that this conﬂict adaptation
process can be context-speciﬁc. This paper presents a proof-of-principle for a competing
account. It is suggested that such context-speciﬁc effects might be driven by very
basic temporal learning processes. In the reported experiment, we manipulated stimulus
contrast in place of congruency. In one location, stimulus letters were mostly easy to
identify (high stimulus contrast). In the other location, letters were mostly hard to identify
(low stimulus contrast). Participants produced a larger contrast effect in the mostly easy
context. Along with supplemental analyses investigating the role of context switching and
previous trial response times, the results are consistent with the notion that different
rhythms of responding are learned for an easy versus hard location context. These results
suggest that context-speciﬁc proportion congruency effects might result, in whole or in
part, from temporal learning. Conﬂict adaptation may or may not play an additional role.
Keywords: context, temporal learning, proportion congruency, conflict adaptation, cognitive control, attention,
contingency learning, contrast
INTRODUCTION
Learning about when to respond is arguably as important as learn-
ing what to respond when interacting with the environment.
Whether for determining the causal relation between events or
using said causal knowledge to optimally respond to stimuli in
the fastest and most accurate manner possible, both contingency
and temporal information are critical for successful performance.
In the context of psychological experiments, detecting regularities
allows for the anticipation of future events on subsequent tri-
als, thus beneﬁting performance when expectations match reality.
For instance, when the series of responses in a task follow a pre-
dictable order, responses are sped up relative to a random ordering
of responses (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987). Similarly, if a neutral
distracting stimulus is predictive of the likely target stimulus, per-
formance is aided when the expected stimulus is presented (e.g.,
Miller, 1987; Schmidt et al., 2007). Also with timing information,
if a cue indicates the likely time at which a stimulus will appear,
performance is sped up if the stimulus appears at the expected
time (e.g., Hsu et al., 2013).
The learning of contingent and temporal regularity occurs
quite easily and has near immediate effects on behavior. One
somewhat unfortunate consequence of this fact is thatmany exper-
iments aimed at investigating something else entirely might end
up unintentionally biased by such learning confounds when a
regularity exists in the task structure that is learnable by par-
ticipants. Of particular interest to the present article, much
debate has focused on the presence of such learning biases in
the cognitive control literature (for a recent review, see Schmidt,
2013a). This paper has two main goals. The more general
goal is to investigate the potential role of contextual infor-
mation in moderating learning, particularly temporal learning.
The more speciﬁc goal is to discuss how context-speciﬁcity in
temporal learning relates to an interesting ﬁnding in the cogni-
tive control literature, namely, the context-speciﬁc proportion
congruent (PC) effect. We begin by providing a background
for the latter of these two goals, and will then return to the
former.
When given the goal to selectively attend to one stimulus while
simultaneously ignoring another distracting stimulus, participants
are not completely successful at doing so. For instance, in the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) participants see color words printed
in colors. On a congruent trial, the word and color match (e.g.,
the word “blue” printed in blue); whereas on an incongruent trial,
the word and color mismatch (e.g., “blue” in red). Responses to
incongruent trials are slower and less accurate than congruent tri-
als. This congruency effect indicates that the distracting word has
partially slipped through the attentional ﬁlter, producing conﬂict.
In the cognitive control literature, it is often assumed that the
attentional system adapts to conﬂict by adjusting the allocation
of attentional resources away from the source of conﬂict (e.g.,
the distracting word) and/or toward the target stimulus (e.g., the
color). This is called the conﬂict adaptation account. One piece
of evidence argued to support the conﬂict adaptation account is
the PC effect : the greater the proportion of incongruent trials, the
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smaller the congruency effect (Lowe and Mitterer, 1982). Accord-
ing to the conﬂict adaptation account (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001),
this occurs because participants detect frequent conﬂict and adjust
attention away from the word.
However, others have argued that the cognitive system might
not be reactive to conﬂict. Instead, ﬁndings such as the PC effect
might be driven by regularities in the task structure that allow for
learning biases (e.g., Schmidt and Besner, 2008; Schmidt, 2013b,c;
for a review, see Schmidt,2013a). For instance, Schmidt andBesner
(2008) (see also Mordkoff, 1996; Jacoby et al., 2003; Schmidt,
2013c) argue that such an effect may be largely explained by sim-
ple word–color contingency learning. When most of the trials are
congruent, then eachword is presentedmost often in its congruent
color. The word is therefore a valid cue of the response on con-
gruent trials, and invalid on incongruent trials, thereby increasing
the congruency effect. When most of the trials are incongruent,
the bias is eliminated or even reversed (depending on the speciﬁc
manipulation). Thus, thePCeffectmight be drivenby contingency
biases, rather than conﬂict adaptation.
The contingency account often seems to undermine the con-
ﬂict adaptation account in explaining both behavioral (e.g., Atalay
and Misirlisoy, 2012; Schmidt, 2013c) and brain data (Grandjean
et al., 2013). However, there are still several ﬁndings that may not
seem to ﬁt well with the simple learning view. One such ﬁnd-
ing is the context-speciﬁc proportion congruent (CSPC) effect.
Corballis and Gratton (2003) used a ﬂanker task in which dis-
tracting letters were mostly congruent with the target letter on
one side of the screen (e.g., left), but mostly incongruent on
the other side of the screen (e.g., right). The congruency effect
was larger in the mostly congruent relative to mostly incongruent
location. This was initially argued as evidence for hemispheric-
speciﬁcity in conﬂict adaptation. However, Crump et al. (2006)
replicated this effect in a Stroop-like procedure with up and
down locations, rather than left and right, and argued instead
that participants simply adapt to conﬂict differently in differ-
ent contextual locations (see also, Wendt et al., 2008). That is,
in the location with mostly incongruent trials attention to the
word is reduced relative to the location with mostly congru-
ent trials. Similarly, Bugg et al. (2008) presented color–word
Stroop stimuli in two fonts. With one font, the word was mostly
congruent; and with the other, the word was mostly incongru-
ent. The congruency effect was larger for the mostly congruent
font. This again might suggest that participants can dynamically
(i.e., on a trial-to-trial basis) adjust their attention to distract-
ing words on the basis of contextual cues, such as fonts or
locations.
What is interesting about CSPC effects is that they have been
argued to be difﬁcult to explain via a contingency learning account.
The distracting word, for instance, is not predictive of which
response to make. Indeed, every word is both mostly congruent
and mostly incongruent, depending on the context. Similarly, the
context cue (e.g., location) is not predictive of what response to
make. Thus, such data have been taken as strong support for the
notion that conﬂict adaptation does occur. However, the CSPC
effect could be explained with a contingency learning mecha-
nism by assuming that multiple irrelevant cues are combined
to predict the response. For instance, in the mostly congruent
location “blue” predicts a blue response, whereas in the mostly
incongruent location “blue” predicts a green response. Thus, it
is not unreasonable to assume that participants might combine
two distracting cues, such as the word and stimulus location, to
jointly predict the response. Indeed, Mordkoff and Halterman
(2008) demonstrated exactly this in three ﬂanker experiments.
Color and shape combinations were used as ﬂankers to unre-
lated target stimuli. Just like in a CSPC experiment, each ﬂanker
color was predictive of one response (e.g., left key press) when
presented with one shape, and the other response (e.g., right)
when presented with a different shape. Participants responded
faster for the high contingency color–shape conjunctions than
the low-contingency color–shape conjunctions. More generally,
work on occasion setting suggests that participants can use con-
junctive stimulus information quite readily (for a review, see
Holland, 1992).
However, even if contingency learning can be context-speciﬁc
in this way, there are still results that are not explainable by
such a mechanism. Of particular interest, Crump and Milliken
(2009; see also Heinemann et al., 2009; Reuss et al., 2014) used
both context and transfer items in a single CSPC experiment.
Context items were manipulated for PC across locations. Trans-
fer items were not manipulated for PC, having equal congruency
proportions in both locations. While combining the word and
the location might provide predictive information on context
items, this would be impossible for transfer items. A CSPC effect
was observed for both item types, however. A contingency learn-
ing account is therefore unsatisfactory for explaining the effects
on transfer items, because such items were frequency-unbiased.
Indeed, the fact that an effect occurs for the transfer items at
all indicates that behavior is being inﬂuenced, at least in part,
in a non-item-speciﬁc way. That is, transfer items only produce
a CSPC effect due to the inﬂuence of the intermixed context
items. Contingency biases likely do play some role in produc-
ing the CSPC effect, but it is clear that they are not the whole
story.
However, another learning bias that might explain a compo-
nent of CSPC effects, particularly for frequency-unbiased transfer
items, is temporal learning. In addition to learning what response
to make to a stimulus, participants can also learn the timing
of responses (Matzel et al., 1988; Taatgen and Van Rijn, 2011).
According to the temporal learning account, participants learn
about when to respond based on the rhythm of the task (e.g.,
Grosjean et al., 2001). This timing information can inﬂuence sub-
sequent behavior. For instance, the speed of responding to one task
affects the speed of responding to a second, intermixed task (for
a review, see Los, 1996). Note that such effects are by deﬁnition
not (entirely) item-speciﬁc: performance on some items affects
performance on others. Multiple potential mechanisms for such
effects have been proposed. For instance, temporal information
might be used to alter response caution (Van Maanen et al., 2011),
to balance speed and accuracy (Kinoshita and Mozer, 2006), or to
make time-criterion adjustments (Lupker et al., 1997).
There are multiple possible mechanisms for temporal learn-
ing. Most can explain components of the PC effect. For instance,
Schmidt (2013b) suggested that participants develop expectancies
of when they will be able to respond on the basis of previous trials.
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When a response is sufﬁciently active at the expected time, a short-
cut in responding can occur. In the mostly congruent condition,
the expected time to respondwill be relatively early in the trial, due
to the preponderance of congruent trials. Subsequent congruent
trials will thus beneﬁt from this temporal expectancy, because a
response is likely to be active enough at the expected time, allowing
a response to be produced even faster than usual (e.g., because the
response threshold is temporally decreased at the expected time).
In contrast, incongruent trials will not beneﬁt, because there will
be insufﬁcient evidence for the correct response at the expected
time, meaning that evidence has to continue accruing and the
expectancy window is missed. This produces a relatively large con-
gruency effect. In the mostly incongruent condition, the expected
time to respond will be relatively later in the trial, due to the pre-
ponderance of incongruent trials. Subsequent incongruent trials
will thus beneﬁt from this temporal expectancy, because evidence
for the correct response will be strong enough at the expected time
to beneﬁt from an expectancy-based shortcutting in responding.
In contrast, congruent trials will not beneﬁt, because a response
will have already been made before the expected time to respond,
thus missing out on the added beneﬁt of matching the rhythm
of previous trials. This produces a relatively smaller congruency
effect.
According to the temporal learning account, the PC effect is
not due to conﬂict per se, but merely to the speed of responding
in the task. In support of this, large portions of the PC effect are
driven by the speed of responding to previous trials (Kinoshita
et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2013b). Moreover, Schmidt (2013b) showed
that a “pseudo” PC effect can be produced without manipulat-
ing conﬂict and without the presence of a distracting stimulus.
Instead, target letters weremanipulated for stimulus contrast, with
high contrast (easy to see) and low contrast (hard to see) letters.
Thus, fast (high contrast) and slow (low contrast) responses are
still made, but without a conﬂict manipulation. To manipulate
timing, letters were presented most often in high contrast (mostly
easy) for half of the participants and most often in low contrast
(mostly hard) for the other half. The contrast effect (i.e., lowminus
high contrast trials) was larger in the mostly easy relative to the
mostly hard condition. This proportion easy effect therefore paral-
lels the PC effect. It was further demonstrated by Schmidt (2014)
that the proportion easy effect is not (at least primarily) item-
speciﬁc. Some context letters were manipulated for “proportion
easy” whereas other intermixed transfer items were not. While
there was some (non-signiﬁcant) hint that the proportion easy
effect might have been larger for context items, a reliable propor-
tion easy effect was observed for both item types. This indicates
that participants can learn the overall speed of the task, which then
produces larger effects (of whatever sort) in themostly easy context
relative to the mostly hard context, even for frequency-unbiased
transfer items.
It might then be suggested that participants in the experiment
of Crump and Milliken (2009) produced larger congruency effects
in the mostly congruent location because of a different temporal
expectancy for each location. In other words, temporal learning
might be context-speciﬁc. The expectancy for a relatively quick
response for stimuli presented in the mostly congruent location
(i.e., due to a preponderance of fast congruent trials) beneﬁts
congruent trials, whereas the expectancy for a relatively slow
response for stimuli presented in the mostly incongruent loca-
tion (i.e., due to a preponderance of slow incongruent trials)
beneﬁts incongruent trials. It is, of course, extremely difﬁcult to
de-confound temporal learning and conﬂict biases in an exper-
iment, because proportion congruency and the proportion of
fast responses are inherently confounded. Thus, it is difﬁcult to
conceive a way to test for conﬂict adaptation effects indepen-
dent of temporal biases. It is possible, however, to provide a
proof-of-principle that temporal learning biases can produce an
interaction that mimics the CSPC effect, even in the absence of
conﬂict in the task. In that vein, the current experiment aims
to test the context-speciﬁc temporal learning account by manip-
ulating the proportion of easy (high contrast) items across two
display locations. If the contrast effect is observed to be larger in
the mostly easy location than the mostly hard location, then this
would be consistent with the notion that temporal learning can be
context-speciﬁc.
Such a ﬁnding would also provide an important proof-of-
principle that the context-speciﬁc temporal learning account
might provide a viable alternative interpretation of the CSPC
effect. Because there is no conﬂict in the task (indeed, there are
no distracters at all), the conﬂict adaptation account would not
predict an effect. The temporal learning account, on the other
hand, merely assumes that the difference in response time (RT)
between easy and hard items is inﬂuenced by the proportion of
easy and hard items. In other words, it is important that partic-
ipants respond faster in one context than the other, but it is not
important why participants respond faster or slower in a given
context. Thus, an experiment constructed analogously to a CSPC
task but without a manipulation of conﬂict, should nevertheless
produce the same interaction.
In the interest of better understanding context-speciﬁcity in
temporal learning, the experiment tested two other side questions.
First, it seemed possible that the proportion easy effect might be
dependent in somewayonwhether the context of the previous trial
matched the context of the current trial. For instance, it might
be the case that a context-speciﬁc proportion easy effect is only
observed on context (i.e., location) repetition trials, where the
context remains consistent from one trial to the next. On context
alternation trials, it might be the case that there is a cost of shifting
contexts that results in the elimination (or reduction) of temporal
expectancies. Evidence consistent with this notion is present in
CSPC studies (King et al., 2012a,b).
Second, it is known that the RT of the immediately preced-
ing trial has a large inﬂuence on performance on the next trial.
For instance, not only is previous trial RT highly correlated with
current trial RT, but congruency effects increase the faster the
previous trial RT (e.g., Kinoshita et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2013b).
This is highly consistent with time-based learning accounts. In
these accounts, participants learn when to respond on the basis
of previous performance, so it only stands to reason that the
immediately-preceding trial should have some measurable impact
on current trial performance. This follows the same logic already
discussed when explaining the temporal learning account. For
instance, following a fast response to an easy item, another easy
item should be able to be responded to particularly fast (just like
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a fast rhythm of responding should beneﬁt responding more on
congruent than incongruent trials). Following a slow response
to a hard item, another hard item should be responded to faster
than typical (just like a slow rhythm of responding should ben-
eﬁt responding more on incongruent than on congruent trials).
Because the temporal learning account is proposed to explain the
context-speciﬁc proportion easy effect, a few predictions follow.
First but least important, previous and current RT should cor-
relate. Second, the contrast effect should be larger the faster the
previous RT. Again, this is because easy trials will beneﬁt most
following a fast (easy) trial, whereas hard trials will not, result-
ing in a large contrast effect following fast responses. The exact
opposite is true following a slow (hard) trial, resulting in smaller
contrast effects following slower RTs. Third, the impact of previ-
ous trial RT should be especially large when the context repeats
from one trial to the next. When the context alternates, the pre-
vious RT does not correspond to the same context, so the effect
should be attenuated. We therefore conducted analyses that were
speciﬁcally designed to assess these predictions. Notably, it is
unclear why the conﬂict adaptation or any other attentional ﬁl-
tering account should make any of these predictions regarding
previous RT. First, there is no conﬂict in the task to adapt to.
Second, these accounts merely argue that attention is adapted
to the conﬂict level associated with a given context, not to time
information.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 60 Ghent University undergraduates who par-
ticipated in exchange for €5. The research was approved by the
Ethical Committee at Ghent University. Participants provided
informed consent before participating.
APPARATUS
Stimulus and response timing were controlled by E-Prime 2
(Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA, USA). Participants
responded to the letters D, F, J, and K with the D, F, J, and K keys
of an AZERTY keyboard of a laptop PC, respectively. The laptop
PC had a 15′′ monitor.
MATERIALS AND DESIGN
The stimulus letters for the experiment were D, F, J, and K. Let-
ters were presented on a dark gray background (100,100,100).
Before the main experiment, there was a 24-trial practice phase,
consisting of six presentations of each letter in the center of
the screen in white (255, 255, 255). In the main phase of
the experiment, letters were presented in either high contrast
gray (200, 200, 200) or low contrast gray (110, 110, 110),
for a total of eight unique letter–contrast combinations. Let-
ters were presented in bold, 18 pt Courier New font on a
640 × 480 resolution screen setting. On half of the trials, the
letter appeared on the top half of the screen (four lines up from
the center), and on the other half of the trials on the bottom
half of the screen (four lines down from the center). In one
location (mostly easy), each letter was presented 70% of the
time in high contrast and 30% in low contrast. In the other
location (mostly hard), the proportions were reversed. Which
location (above or below) served as the mostly easy location
was counterbalanced across participants. The contrast effect is
deﬁned as the difference between high and low contrast tri-
als. A context-speciﬁc proportion easy effect is deﬁned as a
larger contrast effect in the mostly easy location context relative
to the mostly hard context. For the main part of the experi-
ment, there were a total of 300 trials selected at random with
replacement.
PROCEDURE
Participants were instructed to press the key corresponding to the
letter on the screen (e.g., press the K key for the letter K). Each
trial began with a blank screen for 500 ms, followed by the target
letter for 2000 ms or until a response was made. Correct responses
were immediately followed by the next trial, whereas incorrect
responses and trials on which participants failed to respond in
2000 ms were followed by a centrally located “XXX” in red (255, 0,
0) for 500 ms.
RESULTS
Mean correct RTs and percentage errors were calculated. Analy-
ses were conducted with a linear mixed effect (LME) model in
order to assess any overall beneﬁts for stimuli presented in one
of the two stimulus locations and/or interactions between stim-
ulus location and the other factors. Note that such an analysis
cannot easily be performed with a standard repeated-measures
ANOVA1. For those unfamiliar with LME models, it is suf-
ﬁcient to know that we performed our analysis in a roughly
identical fashion to a typical repeated-measures ANOVA, only
with a type of dataset that ANOVA cannot handle (see Foot-
note 1). We performed all analyses using the MIXED command
in SPSS with maximum likelihood estimation. Note that while
LME can be used for much more advanced analyses, we used
LME to produce a simple analysis roughly equivalent to repeated-
measures ANOVA. For the initial analyzes, the ﬁxed factors
were contrast (high vs. low), context (mostly easy vs. mostly
hard), stimulus location (above vs. below), and their interac-
tions. High contrast, mostly easy, and below were coded as
1, and the other levels as 0. The mean RT for each partici-
pant in each of the unique factor combinations were used for
the analysis. Participants were inserted as the single random
effect.
RESPONSE TIMES
The correct RT data are presented in Table 1. The data revealed
a signiﬁcant main effect of contrast, F(1,180) = 476.422, p < .001,
η2p = 0.89, indicating faster responses to high contrast stimuli.
There was also a main effect of context, F(1,180) = 13.628, p < .001,
1In this experiment, half of the participants received mostly easy stimuli above ﬁxa-
tion, and mostly hard stimuli below ﬁxation. The other half of the participants had
the reverse. Thus, both proportion easy and stimulus location were manipulated
within-groups, but the interaction between proportion easy and stimulus location
wasmanipulated between-groups. Standard repeated-measuresANOVAhas no easy
way of handling such data, whereas LME modeling does. Note that the counterbal-
ancing factor could be used in place of location in a repeated-measures ANOVA.
As we conﬁrmed, such an analysis produces exactly the same results as the LME,
but the location effects are represented by very unintuitive interactions between
counterbalancing order and proportion easy.
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Table 1 | Experiment response times and errors (SEs in parentheses).
High Low Effect
RTs Errors RTs Errors RTs Errors
Above
Mostly easy 612 (17) 2.8 (0.5) 728 (22) 3.0 (0.5) 116 0.2
Mostly hard 603 (14) 5.6 (0.9) 704 (16) 5.2 (0.6) 101 −0.4
Difference 15 0.6
Below
Mostly easy 622 (14) 5.6 (0.5) 824 (19) 5.9 (0.9) 202 0.4
Mostly hard 612 (18) 3.4 (0.6) 770 (20) 3.8 (0.6) 158 0.3
Difference 44 0.0
η2p = 0.19, indicating slower overall responses in the mostly easy
condition2. Critically and as predicted, contrast and context inter-
acted, F(1,180) = 4.958, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.08, indicating a smaller
contrast effect in the mostly hard condition. There was also a
main effect of stimulus location, F(1,180) = 46.182, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.44, and an interaction between stimulus location and
contrast, F(1,180) = 29.338, p < .001, η2p = 0.34. These were
due to longer overall RTs and larger contrast effects in the bot-
tom location, respectively. Location did not interact with context,
F(1,60) = 0.112, p = 0.739, η2p < 0.01. Finally, the three-way
interaction between location, contrast, and context was also not
signiﬁcant,F(1,180) = 1.192, p= 0.276,η2p = 0.02, showing that the
context-speciﬁc temporal learning effect was roughly equivalent in
both locations.
PERCENTAGE ERRORS
The error data are also presented in Table 1. Generally, the
error data were much less sensitive. There was no signiﬁcant
contrast effect, F(1,180) = 0.106, p = 0.745, η2p < 0.01, no
context effect, F(1,180) = 0.217, p = 0.642, η2p < 0.01, and
no interaction between the two, F(1,180) = 0.139, p = 0.710,
η2p < 0.01. The main effect of location was also not signiﬁcant,
F(1,180) = 2.222, p = 0.138, η2p < 0.04. Location and context
2 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the main effect of proportion easy might
seem problematic for the temporal learning account. Speciﬁcally, this main effect
seems to indicate that RTs were slower in the mostly easy context than in the mostly
hard context. This might seem inconsistent with the temporal learning account,
which requires the reverse pattern (i.e., faster responses in the mostly easy context).
However, note that this main effect is computed by averaging the mean RT for high
contrast with the mean RT for low contrast in each context. Thus, such an analysis
ignores the relative frequency of high and low contrast items in each context. Because
there are much more high contrast items in the mostly easy context than the mostly
hard context, the average overall RT for the mostly easy location is actually faster.
That is, there are many high contrast trials and few low contrast trials in the mostly
easy context, meaning that most of the responses in the mostly easy context are
fast. In the mostly hard context, it is the reverse, with a large number of (slow) low
contrast items. Indeed, if one simply computes the average RT for each context (i.e.,
ignoring the distinction between high and low contrast items), overall RTs were
signiﬁcantly faster in the mostly easy context (659 ms) than the mostly hard context
(693 ms), F(1,16323) = 87.283, p < .001, η2p = 0.75. This 34 ms difference therefore
shows that the temporal regularity did indeed exist for learning context-speciﬁc
regularities.
did interact, F(1,60) = 12.723, p < 0.001, η2p < 0.18. Loca-
tion and contrast did not interact, F(1,180) = 0.425, p = 0.515,
η2p < 0.01. The three-way interaction between location, contrast,
and context was also not signiﬁcant, F(1,180) = 0.176, p = 0.676,
η2p < 0.01. Critically, there was no evidence for a speed–accuracy
trade-off.
CONTEXT REPETITIONS
Next, RT data were reassessed for a potential role of repetition ver-
sus alternation of the context from one trial to the next. To assess
this possibility, we conducted another LME model on correct RTs
including the variable context transition (context repetition ver-
sus context alternation). Because the previous trial context will
be correlated with previous trial contrast (e.g., more high con-
trast trials if the previous trial was the mostly easy location),
we also included the factor of previous trial contrast (high ver-
sus low). Thus, we added these two new factors to the LME
model, along with their interactions with the other factors. Again,
a mean for each unique combination of these factors was com-
puted for each participants for the analysis. In this analysis,
all the previously reported results were replicated. Most impor-
tantly, the contrast by context interaction remained signiﬁcant,
F(1,898) = 9.740, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.14. Interestingly, this context-
speciﬁc proportion easy effect was not modulated by context
transition, F(1,898) = 0.027, p = 0.871, η2p < 0.01, or by pre-
vious trial contrast, F(1,898) = 1.667, p = 0.197, η2p = 0.03.
Responses were, however, faster overall if the context repeated,
F(1,898) = 81.449, p < 0.001, η2p < 0.58, and the contrast effect
was smaller on a context repetition, F(1,898) = 4.459, p = 0.035,
η2p < 0.07. There was no main effect of previous trial contrast,
F(1,898) = 0.021, p = 0.886, η2p < 0.01, but the contrast effect was
larger if the previous trial was high contrast, F(1,898) = 6.631,
p = .010, η2p = 0.10. Thus, context transition and previous
trial contrast did have an impact on current trial contrast, but
not on the critical proportion easy effect. All other effects were
non-signiﬁcant.
PREVIOUS RESPONSE TIMES
Next, we assessed the possible role of previous trial RTs on the size
of the contrast effect. Of course, every trial had a unique previous
RT associated with it. Thus, all trials were inserted into the LME.
Trials with an error on the current or previous trial were excluded
fromanalyses, however. Participantswere again added as a random
factor. The ﬁxed main effect factors included the scale variable of
previous RT and the binary factors contrast, context, location, pre-
vious trial contrast, and context transition. For the binary factors,
low contrast, mostly hard, above location, previous low contrast,
and context repetition were coded as zero, with the other level
of each of these factors codes as one. Previous RT and the RT
dependent measure were inverse transformed (–1000/RT, similar
to Kinoshita et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2013b) to correct violations of
normality,3 and were centered on the mean to avoid correlation
3Note that with regard to the statistics that follow the –1000/RT inverse transform
is equivalent to a 1/RT inverse transform. The only differences are that the negative
sign preserves themore intuitive direction of effects, and the 1000multiplier reduces
the numbers of decimal places in the parameter estimates.
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with the intercept. Investigation of theQ–Qplots revealed no need
for trimming the tails of the distribution.
Three models were tested. Model A was the fully factorial
model, including all interactions between the six factors. This
was obviously a very complex model with far too many terms.
We therefore tested two simpler models. Model B was the same
as Model A with the exclusion of many non-signiﬁcant and seem-
ingly irrelevant interactions involving previous RT. Only the main
effect of previous RT and its two- and three-way interactions with
contrast and context transition were retained. Model C was sim-
pler still. In neither Model A nor Model B was any main effect
or interaction involving previous contrast signiﬁcant. Model C
was thus identical to Model B with the exclusion of previous
contrast.
To select the best of the three models we assessed the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information crite-
rion (BIC) scores. For those unfamiliar with such information
criteria, AIC and BIC are two different ways to assess the amount
of variance explained by a set of factors and can be used to assess
whether a more complex model does or does not add anything
meaningful to a simpler model. For both AIC and BIC, lower
scores indicate a better model. Model A produced the worst (high-
est) scores of the three models (AIC: 18467; BIC: 18975), and was
therefore excluded. Model B produced a slightly better (lower)
AIC score than Model C (Model B: 18446; Model C: 18452), but a
notably worse BIC score (Model B: 18739; Model C: 18621). The
difference between these two measures is not so surprising given
the harsher penalty BIC gives to added factors. Whether to favor
AIC or BIC scores is a matter of heated contention, but we note
that none of the factors that Model C excludes were signiﬁcant in
Model B and the results of the key comparisons were qualitatively
the same in both models (i.e., same signiﬁcant and non-signiﬁcant
effects). We therefore decided to present the simplest model (i.e.,
Model C).
Table 2presents the parameters and statistical tests forModelC.
Note that the RT dependent measure was inversed transformed,
so the parameter estimates are difﬁcult to relate back to mean
RT. However, in the following we will explain what each of these
tests show. We ﬁrst consider the tests excluding previous RT
(non-shaded cells in Table 2). There was a main effect of con-
trast, indicating overall slower responses to low contrast items.
There was also a main effect of context, indicating overall faster
responses to mostly hard items. There was no effect of location.
There was a main effect of context transition, indicating faster
responses for repeated locations. As before, contrast and context
interacted, indicating a proportion easy effect. There was also an
interaction between location and context, indicating overall slower
responses to mostly easy items in the below location. Contrast,
context, and location interacted, indicating a larger proportion
easy effect in the below location. No other interactions were
signiﬁcant.
We now consider the effects involving previous RT (shaded
cells in Table 2). There was a main effect of previous RT, indi-
cating that previous RT and current trial RT were correlated.
Critically, we also observed that previous RT and contrast inter-
acted. This indicates that contrast effects were larger the faster the
previous RT. Previous RT also interacted with context transition,
Table 2 | Mixed modeling results.
Variable Estimate SE t p
Intercept −0.071283 0.034188 −2.085 0.041
Contrast 0.415671 0.020591 20.187 <0.001
Context −0.061880 0.020618 −3.001 0.003
Location −0.027907 0.048361 −0.577 0.566
Context transition (CT) −0.109343 0.016075 −6.802 <0.001
Contrast*Context −0.155539 0.029148 −5.336 <0.001
Contrast*Location −0.162065 0.028590 −5.669 <0.001
Contrast*CT −0.020604 0.029425 −0.700 0.484
Context*Location 0.065353 0.029129 2.244 0.025
Context*CT 0.045058 0.029501 1.527 0.127
Location*CT 0.005037 0.022659 0.222 0.824
Contrast*Context*
Location
0.248084 0.040793 6.081 <0.001
Contrast*Context*CT −0.037323 0.041547 −0.898 0.369
Contrast*Location*CT 0.021650 0.040916 −0.529 0.597
Context*Location*CT −0.065708 0.041111 −1.598 0.110
Contrast*Context*
Location*CT
−0.003608 0.057877 −0.062 0.950
Previous RT 0.070863 0.013922 5.090 <0.001
Contrast*Previous RT −0.104218 0.019003 −5.484 <0.001
CT*Previous RT 0.091393 0.019255 4.747 <0.001
Contrast*CT*PreviousRT 0.063083 0.027095 2.328 0.020
indicating a higher correlation between previous RT and current
trial RT when the context repeated. Particularly interesting, previ-
ous RT, contrast, and context transition interacted. This indicates
that the effect of previous RT on the contrast effect was larger
when the context alternated. Overall, then, the results ﬁt perfectly
with the predictions of the temporal learning account.
DISCUSSION
The current paper makes two novel contributions to the literature.
First, the results of our experiment are consistent with our sug-
gestion that temporal learning can function in a context-speciﬁc
manner. Speciﬁcally, the contrast effect was found to be larger
in the mostly easy location context relative to the mostly hard
context. Thus, the magnitude of an effect on the current trial
is inﬂuenced not only by previous trial RTs, but also by contex-
tual cues. Interestingly, this context-speciﬁc proportion easy effect
was not modulated by the contrast of the previous trial or by
whether or not the context (i.e., location) repeated. The lack of an
effect for location repetitions is particularly interesting, because
it shows that the appearance of the context-speciﬁc proportion
easy effect is not solely driven by those trials on which the con-
text repeats. This would seem to suggest that participants have
two learned rhythms, one for each location context, that they
can ﬂexibly switch between depending on the location in which
the stimulus appears. Note that previous contrast did impact the
magnitude of the current trial contrast effect, but this effect was
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eliminated when previous RT was included as a factor. This sug-
gests that previous trial RTs inﬂuence the size of the contrast
effect, but not previous contrast (which is correlated with previ-
ous RT). This is consistent with results from analyses on list-level
effects, where the same pattern of results was observed (Schmidt,
2013b).
The mixed model analyses including previous RT were par-
ticularly interesting. In line with predictions from the temporal
learning account, previous RT not only correlated with current
trial RT, but also affected the size of the contrast effect. As pre-
dicted, the contrast effect increased as previous RT sped up.
Moreover, this effect of previous RT on the contrast effect was
found to be larger when the context (i.e., location) repeated. This
is consistent with the notion that participants learn a rhythm for
each location, because the previous RT on a context repetition
belongs to the same context as the current trial, whereas on a
context alternation it belongs to a different context.
The second novel contribution of the current work is that
our results hint at an alternative explanation of the CSPC effect.
While previous accounts might have attributed such ﬁndings to
hemisphere-speciﬁc processing (Corballis and Gratton, 2003) or
context-speciﬁc adjustments of cognitive control (Crump et al.,
2006; Bugg et al., 2008; Wendt et al., 2008; Crump and Milliken,
2009), the present results suggest that such effects might instead
be explainable by context-speciﬁc temporal learning. Indeed,
the context-speciﬁc conﬂict adaptation account argues that the
CSPC effect is driven by attentional adjustments to the differing
rates of conﬂict in each location. If the CSPC effect is argued
to be solely explainable by such attentional adjustments, then
the current observation of a context-speciﬁc proportion easy
effect should not have been predicted. Given that the present
contrast design used no conﬂicting stimuli (indeed, there were
no distracters in the task), an interaction between proportion
easy and contrast should not have occurred. Furthermore, it
is not clear how any such attentional ﬁltering account could
explain the inﬂuences of previous RT that we observed in our
data, at least not without considerable added assumptions. Of
course, this does not mean that conﬂict adaptation does not
play a role in the CSPC effect, but our results might suggest, at
minimum, that the contribution of conﬂict adaptation to such
an effect is probably overestimated due to temporal learning
biases.
Unlike attentional accounts, the simple temporal learning
account has no difﬁculties with the current ﬁndings. The effect
of context on the magnitude of difﬁculty effects (e.g., congru-
ency or contrast) is proposed, according to such an account, to
be unrelated to conﬂict. Thus, context-speciﬁc effects should not
be eliminated by removing conﬂict from the task. The temporal
learning view only needs to assume that participants can learn dif-
ferent temporal rhythms for two contexts. If they are in a faster
rhythm (i.e., have earlier temporal expectancies) in the mostly
easy context (i.e., because of the large number of high contrast
or congruent trials), then they will have a larger effect relative to
the slow-rhythm (i.e., later temporal expectancies) mostly hard
context.
Another interesting result that might be seen as consistent with
the temporal learning view comes from Wendt and Kiesel (2011).
They presented participants with a CSPC task in which foreperiod
(i.e., the time between ﬁxation and stimulus presentation) was
the contextual cue. Speciﬁcally, a short foreperiod (200 ms) was
associated with mostly congruent stimuli and a long foreperiod
(1200 ms) was associated with mostly incongruent stimuli, or vice
versa. Congruency effects were larger with the mostly congruent
foreperiod. This is an interesting ﬁnding, as some form of timing
process is necessary to explain such results. While it can certainly
be argued that attentional ﬁltering might be modulated over time
with contextual cues (though this would require some changes
in thinking about conﬂict adaptation effects), such results could
alternatively be argued to be due to participants learning when
to respond based on stimulus onset. The idea that participants
can learn about differing temporal intervals is already an inherent
part of the temporal learning account,meaning that such results ﬁt
quite nicely with the temporal learning viewwithout any necessary
adjustments to the account. As pointed out by Wendt and Kiesel,
this is not the case for extant models of conﬂict monitoring (e.g.,
Blais et al., 2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008), which would need
some retuning to allow for such time-based effects. Indeed, one
of such changes would have to be a mechanism to learn about
timing, further indicating that temporal learning of one form
or another is a highly plausible mechanism for producing CSPC
effects.
As discussed in the Introduction, the temporal learning account
could potentially also explain the transfer effects observed by
Crump and Milliken (2009; see also, Heinemann et al., 2009;
Reuss et al., 2014) for contingency-unbiased items. Indeed, the
items in the current report were entirely contingency-unbiased.
That is, there were no distracting stimuli that could provide
a predictive cue for the likely response. Similarly, the location
context was completely un-predictive of what response would fol-
low. Of course, some letter–contrast–location combinations were
more frequent than others, but the previously discussed results
of Schmidt (2014) demonstrate that proportion easy effects with
contrast are not (at least primarily) item-speciﬁc. Future work
might aim at testing context and transfer items in a context-
speciﬁc proportion easy task to add further credence to this
notion.
The present research is not without limitations, however. Note
that the present results do not rule out the possibility that con-
ﬂict adaptation also contributes to the CSPC effect. The conﬂict
adaptation account does not speciﬁcally predict that a context-
speciﬁc proportion easy effect should not occur. It merely does
not predict such an effect. It could be that both conﬂict adap-
tation and temporal learning play a role in the CSPC effect. Of
course, this is a less parsimonious account than suggesting that
both the context-speciﬁc PC and context-speciﬁc proportion easy
effects are explainable by the same (e.g., temporal learning) mech-
anism. Moreover, even if context-speciﬁc conﬂict adaptation does
occur, the present results would suggest that the CSPC effect is
likely to be confounded with temporal learning biases. Thus, the
best possible outcome that remains for the conﬂict adaptation
view is probably the conclusion that the CSPC effect overesti-
mates the contribution of conﬂict adaptation processes. Future
research might aim to attempt to dissociate the separate inﬂu-
ences of temporal learning and conﬂict adaptation on the CSPC
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effect. As already pointed out, this is unfortunately a dissoci-
ation that will be difﬁcult if not impossible to produce, given
how inherently confounded speed-of-responding and congruency
are. It is certainly our hope, however, that the current work
might serve to inspire other researchers to ﬁnd a solution to this
predicament.
As another caveat, there were a few differences between the
context-speciﬁc proportion easy data observed here and data
from CSPC experiments. For instance, a main effect of propor-
tion easy was observed, such that responses were overall slower
in the mostly easy condition. More speciﬁcally, this main effect
seemed to be the result of the context-speciﬁc proportion easy
effect being driven exclusively by hard items. However, in CSPC
experiments it is uncertain whether such a main effect is observed.
In King et al. (2012a; see also King et al., 2012b) the CSPC effect
was driven by seemingly symmetric effects on congruent and
incongruent trials. On the other hand, the exact same pattern of
interference-driven effects that we observedwas observed in CSPC
error rates by these authors. Crump et al. (2006) do not report
tests for main effects, but their Experiment 1 RTs and Experiment
2a error rates appear numerically consistent with our ﬁndings.
Their Experiment 2a RT data suggest the reverse pattern, how-
ever, with the CSPC seemingly driven by congruent items. As
pointed out by Schmidt (2014), proportion congruency manip-
ulations of all types, much like proportion easy effects observed
in our lab, seem to provide quite inconsistent patterns regarding
whether the effect is located in the congruent trials, incongru-
ent trials, or both. It is not clear how any account explains these
inconsistencies, and we would suggest that future work might aim
to explain not only PC interactions, but also the precise pattern of
means.
One possible explanation is the presence of ﬂoor or ceiling
effects. In some experiments, responses to easy (e.g., congru-
ent) items might be fast enough that no further beneﬁt can be
gained from temporal expectancies (or some other mechanism,
such as conﬂict adaptation). In other experiments, responses
to hard (e.g., incongruent) items might be slow enough that
participants are responding at a maximum slow rate, temporal
expectancies or not. For instance, responding might be thresh-
olded for such hard items. Error rates might be informative in
such a case. This ﬂoor/ceiling argument, however, is admittedly
post hoc and would need corroboration from actual data. Another
possibility might be overall differences in response caution for
differing contexts, though this would seem at ﬁrst glance to pre-
dict the reverse main effect of context observed in the current
report. On the other hand, an early temporal learning account
by Grice (1968) suggested that in an overall harder context, the
threshold for responding might be reduced to expedite process-
ing of difﬁcult items. This notion is consistent with the ﬁnding
of slower responses for both the easy and hard item types in
the mostly easy condition. Whatever the explanation, note that
the observed main effect does not present an inherent problem
for the temporal learning account, as the overall mean RT of
responses in mostly easy context was faster than in the mostly
hard context.2
As another limitation, it is noteworthy that we did not ﬁnd
a modulation of the context-speciﬁc proportion easy effect as a
function of whether or not the context repeated from one trial
to the next. Such modulations have been observed in CSPC
experiments (King et al., 2012a,b). Though not impossible that
we simply lacked the statistical power to detect such a modula-
tion, no clear evidence for one was observed. This inconsistency
does leave open the possibility that the context-speciﬁc propor-
tion easy effect is not driven by the same mechanism as the CSPC
effect, which would undermine the temporal learning account
of CSPC effects suggested in the current manuscript. On the
other hand, we provided an important control on the context
transition analysis by including previous contrast in the analysis.
This is important, because previous trial contrast is highly con-
founded with context transition. Unfortunately, the same control
was not used in previous research investigating the role of con-
text transition in CSPC experiments. Speciﬁcally, previous trial
congruency was not coded along with context transition. Thus,
the observation of larger CSPC effects following context repe-
titions relative to context alternations could have been due to
a previous trial congruency confound. Indeed, the direction of
observed effects is consistent with such a confound. Furthermore,
such interactions between previous and current trial congruency
are well documented (Gratton et al., 1992) and may be, in full
or in part, driven by feature repetition or other learning biases
(Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004; Schmidt and De Houwer,
2011; Mordkoff, 2012). Thus, there is strong reason to suspect a
confound in the analyses of King and colleagues. As such, future
research or reanalysis of existing data to answer this question is
well warranted.
As another limitation, while our experiment was designed to
test the a priori hypothesis that a context-speciﬁc proportion easy
effect could be observed in the absence of a conﬂict manipulation
due to a temporal learning process, it is alternatively possible that
yet another account explains either the context-speciﬁc proportion
easy effect or both the context-speciﬁc proportion easy and CSPC
effects. One account, intimately related to the temporal learning
account presented here, is the response caution account. Accord-
ing the response caution account, context-speciﬁc effects could be
driven by increases in the response threshold when experiencing
unexpected stimulus combinations for a context. For instance, a
low contrast item is not expected in the mostly easy context, and
thismight lead to an increase in the response threshold, thus delay-
ing responding. A similar process would occur for high contrast
items in the mostly hard context.
Indeed, evidence for a response threshold account of CSPC
effects has been presented by King et al. (2012a). They used a
quantitative model to test how well a threshold account ﬁt the data
relative to an evidence accrual model (the latter of which is con-
sistent with a conﬂict adaptation process). The response threshold
model was found to provide a much better ﬁt than the evidence
accrual model. The authors therefore argued that the CSPC effect
is better explained by response caution than conﬂict adaptation.
It should be noted that the response caution predictions match
those of the temporal learning perspective, because both accounts
predict a relatively lower threshold for expected stimuli (con-
gruent mostly congruent and incongruent mostly incongruent)
relative to unexpected stimuli (congruent mostly incongruent
and incongruent mostly congruent). Similar time-based accounts,
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such as the adaptation to the statistics of the environment (ASE)
model (e.g., Kinoshita et al., 2011), are also consistent with such
results. We therefore think that determining which variant of these
response threshold models provides the best ﬁt to proportion
easy and PC effects is an important goal for future research to
address.
Though inconsistent with the above-mentioned ﬁnding that
CSPC effects are more in line with a response threshold rather
than evidence accrual mechanism, it could nevertheless be pro-
posed that some other form of attentional ﬁltering mechanism
explains the context-speciﬁc proportion easy effect observed in
the current manuscript. While it seems that conﬂict adapta-
tion can be safely ruled out for the context-speciﬁc proportion
easy effects observed with the present design, perhaps it could
be argued that the cognitive system learns to better extract tar-
get information of the most frequent contrast level in each
context. That is, high contrast stimuli might be better pro-
cessed in the mostly easy location, and low contrast stimuli
in the mostly hard location via some form of attentional cap-
ture (e.g., see Cosman and Vecera, 2014; Thomson et al., 2014)
of the most likely contrast level. It is not entirely clear how
such an attentional mechanism would work, however. For
instance, it seems unlikely that information accrual of low con-
trast items in the mostly hard context would be improved
without similarly improving high contrast items in the same
context. The plausibility of this account is further weakened
by the fact that the modeling results of King et al. (2012a)
seem to argue against an evidence accrual account of context-
speciﬁc effects. Further still, it is not clear how such an
account would explain the effects of previous RT we observed.
Still, it should be acknowledged that the manipulation of
“easy” and “hard” did involve using stimuli of differing lumi-
nance. This is not optimal for comparison with CSPC exper-
iments, where luminance is equated across easy (congruent)
and hard (incongruent) items. Future experiments with differ-
ent manipulations of stimulus ease would thus be a welcome
addition.
It should also be noted that the temporal learning view does
share some similarities with the conﬂict adaptation view. In both
accounts, it is assumed that contextual information is used to
adjust performance. In the conﬂict adaptation view, attention
is adjusted to minimize conﬂict. In the temporal learning view,
expectancies are adjusted to maximize the speed of responding.
Both accounts therefore propose an adjustment of performance in
order to beneﬁt the task goal, but merely differ in what is adapted
to (i.e., conﬂict versus temporal information) and how perfor-
mance is adjusted (i.e., attentional modulations versus temporal
expectancies). These are not trivial differences, of course, and we
hope that future research will further the investigation of these
issues. The current results only provide a proof-of-principle that
temporal learning might provide a sufﬁcient explanation of CSPC
effects. Further work will be required to draw more deﬁnitive
conclusions.
At the broader level, the current results suggest that temporal
learning occurs in a context-speciﬁc fashion and that switching
between contexts can occur on a relatively quick, trial-by-trial
basis. This is an interesting ﬁnding in its own respect that might
be investigated further in future research. Rapid context-speciﬁcity
in temporal learning also need not be viewed as unintuitive.
While many rhythmic behaviors may entail producing an action
in equally spaced intervals, this is not always the case. For instance,
not all notes in a song will be quarter notes. Some notes will come
sooner or later, often with deliberate syncopation. Thus, even with
the most obvious example of rhythmic behavior (i.e., music), con-
text (in this case, the notes that came before the current one) plays
an important role in modifying behavior.
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